



Olaf J. de Groot and Cathérine Müller 
 
© OPENDEMOCRACY 
· What are the risks involved in the 
occurrence of terrorism? 
 
· What are the major policy options in 
fighting terrorism? 
 
· Are the current policy options (cost) 
effective? 
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Summary: Human-induced security, or terrorism, 
is a threat to wellbeing in Europe and beyond. In 
this  Policy  Briefing,  we  investigate  the  risks 
involved  in  terrorism,  both  with  respect  to  the 
likelihood and with respect to the consequences of 
acts of terrorism. 
Furthermore,  we  provide  a  basic  analysis  of 
existing anti-terrorism policies, the costs involved 
in  them  and  their  effectiveness.  We  show  that 
terrorism is a very broad term, but that one can 
make a number of broad policy recommendations, 
including  the  fact  that  the  rational  economic 
approach  to  terrorism  recognizes  that  terrorists 











While one might expect that the economic analysis of 
terrorism  focuses  mainly  on  the  understanding  of 
what economic circumstances affect the occurrence of 
terrorism and how the occurrence of terrorism affects 
economic outcomes, this is a very simplistic view. In 
reality, the contributions of economists to the analysis 
of  security  stems  mostly  from  a  methodological 
contribution  by  employing  economic  modeling  and 
econometric  tools  to  questions  of  security.  Using 
these, economists contribute to the understanding of 
the behavior of individuals and groups that engage in 
terrorist  activities,  in  order  to  propose  policies  that 
can effectively stop them. 
Within the EUSECON project, several research avenues 
are explored that contribute to the stock of knowledge 
on  this  topic.  This  particular  Policy  Briefing  is 
substantially based on Müller (2011), but it is part of a 
greater  body  of  work  initiated  by  EUSECON  project 
partners. 
Insecurity is broader than just terrorism 
While  in  this  briefing,  we  focus  on  the  role  of 
terrorism, it is important to remember that insecurity 
has  a  much  broader  basis.  In  fact,  it  is  widely 
recognized that terrorism is only a subcategory of the 
broad spectrum of insecurities that we currently face 
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Extreme events, like terrorism, can lead to 
individuals overestimating the assessed risk 
The  first  distinction  that  is  made  in  the  analysis  of 
insecurity is between natural (e.g. natural disasters), 
accidental  (e.g.  industrial  accidents)  and  purposeful 
(e.g. terrorism or crime) security threats.  
While  both  natural  and  accidental  insecurity  are 
highly regrettable, the policy implications thereof need 
to  be  found  primarily  in  coping  and  preventative 
solutions. For example, in the case of natural disasters, 
it is pivotal to have early warning systems in place and 
effective plans for evacuation if the need arises. In the 
case of accidental insecurity, there needs to be a focus 
on prevention. While industrial incidents can always 
occur  in  any  case,  the  probability  of  occurrence  is 
affected  by  the  kind  of  security  regulations  that 
industrial production facilities are confronted with. In 
addition,  preventative  policy 
measures, such as limiting potentially 
dangerous  industrial  zones  to  non-
residential areas, can save many lives. 
Purposeful  human-induced  insecurity  is  different 
though. It is distinct from the other forms of security 
because of the aim of agents to harm another person 
or their property, or to accept harm to others as a side-
effect. Terrorism is defined as the use of violence to 
achieve  a  political  objective  (Enders  and  Sandler, 
1993), which hints at three important characteristics: 
1)  It  pursues  a  political  goal,  2)  it  directly  targets 
civilians  and  3)  the  actual  targeted  audience  is  the 
state. Thus, terrorism is of a two-sided asymmetrical 
nature (Stepanova, 2008), in which perpetrators and 
the state play opposing roles.  
What is the true risk of terrorism? 
The risk of terrorism is defined as a function of threat, 
vulnerability, and consequences, conditional on anti-
terrorism  measures  taken  by  private  and  public 
agents.  The  probability  of  a  country  becoming  a 
terrorist  target  depends  on  various  factors.  These 
factors include the attractiveness of the country or a 
given location in that country for terrorist aims, the 
motivations  and  drivers  of  terrorism,  and  the 
capabilities of a terrorist group or network to conduct 
successful attacks, both in general and in that county 
in  particular.  The  capability  of  a  terrorist  group  or 
network  refers  to  its  ability  to  recruit  ‘productive’ 
terrorists, to organize and finance themselves, to plan 
an  attack  and  to  manage  the  necessary  logistics,  to 
name but a few of these features.  
There is a wide range of academic studies looking at 
the  characteristics  of  individuals  taking  part  in 
terrorist  activities.  Contrary  to  the  common 
perception,  these  studies  do  not  find  that  terrorist 
engagement  is  associated  with  poor  education,  low 
economic  status,  or  irrationality  (e.g.  Krueger  and 
Maleckova, 2003). Indeed, they find that there is only 
marginal  evidence  that  economic  conditions  or 
education are associated with terrorism and instead 
point  towards  factors  like  political  instability, 
demography, institutions and societal polarization. 
According to the classification of Krugman (2004), the 
costs of terrorism can be divided between 1) economic 
costs imposed by the damage done to buildings and 
infrastructure; the loss of life; and the disruption to 
the  economy;  2)  costs  involved  in  the  behavioral 
response  to  terrorism;  and  3)  the  costs  induced  by 
security  spending  and  anti-terrorism  measures. 
Research finds that there is an important distinction 
between  one-off  and  persistent  terrorism.  Singular 
events  appear  to  have  only  short-term  impacts  on 
both  economic  growth  and  the  performance  of  the 
stock  market,  whereas  a  persistent  reign  of  terror, 
such as in the Basque Region, can have a considerable 
long-term impact. 
A larger impact, particularly concerning non-repetitive 
incidents  is  the  resulting  increase  in  uncertainty. 
Extreme events, like terrorism, can lead to individuals 
overestimating actual risk and thus be driven by non-
rational  expectations.  Several  studies  show  that this 
behavioral  change  not  just  affects  consumption 
patterns, but also political preferences. For example, 
Bozzoli  and  Müller  (2011)  show  that  there  is  a 
relationship  between  terrorist  activity  and  citizen’s 
willingness  to  trade  civil  liberties  for  increased 
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Terrorists are rational: increasing the costs of 
one activity leads to substitution towards others 
responses  to  the  threat  of  terrorism  are  a  factor 
needing greater examination. 
What kind of anti-terrorism measures are there? 
The  term  ‘anti-terrorism  measures’  includes  all 
measures and policies designed to reduce the risk of 
terrorism.  This  includes  security  measures,  whether 
via regulation or policy, imposed by private and public 
agents in order to protect either themselves or others, 
to  the  engagement  in  wars  against  terrorism.  Such 
anti-terrorism  measures  can  differ  in  various  ways. 
They can either entail public spending or can impose 
costs  on  private  individuals  and  companies  through 
rules and regulations. 
Economists  distinguish  between  two  (non-mutually 
exclusive)  types  of  classification  of  anti-terrorism 
measures:  1)  the  differentiation  between  defensive 
and  pro-active  measures  and  2)  the  differentiation 
between deterrent and ‘positive’ measures. 
The  distinction  between  defensive  and  pro-active 
measures is found in the target of the measure, where 
the first focuses on the intended victims of terrorism, 
and  the  second  focuses  on  the  perpetrators  of 
terrorism.  The  distinction  between  deterrent  and 
‘positive’  (or  ‘benevolent’)  measures,  on  the  other 
hand,  can  be  found  in  their  approach.  Deterrent 
measures  aim  to  make  it  harder  for  terrorists  and 
terrorist  groups  to  engage  in  terrorism,  whereas 
positive  measures  are  intended  to  create  incentives 
that induce terrorists to choose to refrain from their 
engagement  in  such  activities.  A  great  challenge  for 
policy  is  the  mixed  public-private  good  nature  of 
security  provision  concerning  terrorism.  While 
defensive  measures  are  largely  a  private  good,  pro-
active  measures  have  strong  public  good 
characteristics. This has the potential to lead to public 
policy  failure,  thus  stressing  the  importance  of 
multilateral cooperation and the application of a ‘mix’ 
of anti-terrorism measures. 
How (cost-) effective are existing policies? 
Effective  decision-making  regarding  anti-terrorism 
measures  should  address  both  the  costs  of  the 
measures and the benefits thereof. The evaluation of 
anti-terrorism  measures  is  an  important  step  in 
exploring  to  what  extent  spending  on  this  issue  is 
warranted. From the researcher’s point of view, there 
are  two  major  challenges  to  be  overcome  in  such 
analysis. First, there is only limited 
data  available  when  it  comes  to 
anti-terrorism  policy  since  the 
availability  of  such  data  could 
jeopardize  its  effectiveness.  Second,  incidents  of 
terrorism are only recorded at the moment they occur 
and  there  is  no  data  on  the  time  of  planning, 
preparation, recruitment and logistics. On top of that, 
usually only (nearly) successful attacks are recorded, 
thus creating a systemic data collection bias. 
There  are  some  successful  analyses.  Drakos  and 
Giannakopoulos  (2009)  find  that  between  1970  and 
2003, authorities became better able to stop potential 
terrorist attacks, and that such attacks started to tilt 
more towards material damage rather than loss of life. 
The  most  important  findings  from  this  study  and 
others  like  it  is  that  terrorists  act  rationally:  an 
increase  in  the  relative  price  of  performing  one 
activity leads to a substitution effect away from that 
activity  and  toward  others.  For  example,  the 
introduction of metal detectors at American airports 
led  to  a  migration  of  potential  airplane  hijackers  to 
other targets. 
Finally,  the  political  economy  literature  finds  that 
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their  electorates  than  by  the  real  effects  of  their 
policies. Thus, the perceptions and preferences of the 
public  regarding  terrorist  threats  are  of  great 
importance. That means that decisions could be made 
on irrational grounds, such as public fears that do not 
stand up to detailed scrutiny. For that reason, it is very 
important  to  take  into  account  the  non-monetary 
aspects of politician’s calculations concerning security 
policy. The result is that, depending on the behavior of 
the  public  and  the  uncertainty  regarding  the 
information provided to people, public security can be 
either under- or overprovided. 
Policy recommendations 
In this briefing, we give an overview of the different 
aspects  of  anti-terrorism  research  from  the 
policymaker’s  perspective.  For  policymakers  it  is 
important  to  remember  that  terrorists  are  not  as 
monolithic  as  expected.  Terrorists  respond  to 
incentives in the same rational way as other economic 
actors  do.  This  implies  that  policy  responses should 
account  for  substitution  effects  in  terms  of  time, 
means,  and  geographic  locations.  Due  to  the  public 
good  nature  of  security  provision,  anti-terrorism 
measures  should  also  be  flexible  and  multilateral. 
Anti-terrorism measures targeting the root causes of 
terrorism must be carefully chosen and implemented. 
Finally, while there is some literature evaluating the 
cost-effectiveness of anti-terrorism measures, this is a 
field in which much more research is needed. 
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